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Class, Politics, Gender, and the Marriage Divide in the United Sates 
June Carbone and Naomi Cahn 
 
Abstract  
 
We use the idea of the “marriage divide” to describe the transformation of the family to 
meet the needs of the information economy and the divisions that the transformation has 
created.  In doing so, we emphasize three types of “marriage divides” in the United 
States: class and racial ideological and political, and family law/gender ideology.   
 
Introduction 
 
In the United States, the drumbeat from social conservatives has been incessant.  For well over a 
generation, political and religious conservatives, with the support of many in the center, have 
claimed that the changing family is a societal disaster, gay marriage a threat to morality,  and 
single parent families a major cause of poverty and inequality.  Coupled with the cries of alarm 
has been what we have called a “red”, typically Republican, agenda that insists on reaffirming 
the traditional celebration of the identity of sex, marriage and procreation as the natural (and 
divinely ordained) order for insuring children’s well-being (Douthat, 2014).  Roll back the clock 
and presumably all will be well. 
The left, and many in the center, predictably recoil from these claims.   As a cultural 
matter, modernists and those we have termed politically “blue” oppose any appeal to tradition, 
much less the “divinely ordered” family of breadwinning heterosexual men and stay-at-home 
wives that they accurately see as a relic of the industrial era.  They are more inclined to celebrate 
individual choice and to encourage material well-being, whether this produces single-parent 
families, same-sex partnerships, Islamic marriage contracts, or old-fashioned church wedding 
with brides veiled in white.  At least as fundamentally, they see the calls to restrict abortion 
(along with contraception and sex education) and to promote marriage (particularly by restricting 
divorce) as part of a wholesale attack on women’s autonomy. 
This cultural debate, as modernists and traditionalists shout past each other in the political 
sphere, obscures the question of marriage in securing children’s well-being. All other things 
being equal, after all, two parents are better than one and stability is better than chaos, especially 
in the lives of young children.  Indeed, the argument for the superiority of two parents is 
tautological.  (Amato, 2002: 71–94).  Two parents, by definition, have more time than one parent 
(at least if they are not spending all their additional time fighting with each other).  Two parents 
struggling to balance work and family obligations still typically end up with higher incomes than 
a single parent. Yet marriage has emerged as a marker of class, effectively beyond the reach of 
large parts of the population.  
This paper  discusses how marriage has emerged as a “divide” that exacerbates class and 
race-based inequalities in the United States and triggers deep ideological divisions in crafting the 
appropriate legal and policy responses. We emphasize three types of “marriage divides”: first, 
class and racial disparities, second, the ideological clash between red and blue that frames the 
proposed responses, and third, legal differences that affect the relative balance of power between 
men and women..  The paper concludes that these divides can be bridged only with recognition 
that greater equality is a necessary precondition to more stable unions, children’s well-being 
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requires something more than exclusive reliance on two-parent heterosexual unions, and 
ideological conflicts are blocking forward movement. 
 
The marriage divide:  class and race 
 
Increasing income inequality has remade American society, and the biggest winners and losers in 
the new economy are men, particularly white men.  The result changes the way that men and 
women match up: there are more men at the top of the economy eager to pair with a smaller 
group of successful women.  Marriage is thriving for this group.  (Carbone  & Cahn,  2014).  At 
the bottom, a large percentage of men have become effectively unmarriageable due to high rates 
of chronic unemployment, mass incarceration and substance abuse; marriage is rapidly 
disappearing in these communities. (McLanahan,  2004; Wilcox & Marquardt, 2010).  In the 
middle, both employment and family life have become less stable.  The white women who 
graduate from high school, but not college, have a higher number of cohabitations, married or 
unmarried, than any other group in American society  (Cherlin,  2011).  These developments 
make family a marker of more deeply etched class boundaries.  
These results do not reflect differences in the nature or desirability of marriage.  Indeed, 
sociologists find that all communities value marriage similarly: as an unconditional commitment 
to create an interdependent union with a partner who will share in the joys and obligations of 
creating a family (Carbone & Cahn, 2014) However, as greater inequality has changed the way 
men and women relate to each other, it has changed their expectations about whether they will 
ever find a partner worthy of such commitment.   
These changes reflect “marriage markets,” that is, the definitions of who is likely to marry 
whom. When men outnumber women in any given marriage pool, the men must compete for 
access to desirable women and they invest more in their own income, status and acceptable 
behavior. (Guttentag & Secord, 1983).    When, instead, women outnumber the men, the men 
tend to play the field.  Women, jaded after a few bad experiences with men, become pickier and 
invest more in themselves and their children, relying less on intimate partners.  In a more 
unequal society, marriage markets become more segmented as elites become more likely to 
marry later and to marry each other.  The more segmented the markets, the more they can 
develop in different directions.  
Studies of marriage find that income and education matter in the choice of a mate: people 
are more likely to marry partners like themselves, and warier about partners who cannot pull 
their own weight (Greenwood, et al., 2014; Schwartz & Mare, 2011).  When they do marry, the 
successful men see themselves as competing for the top women (Schwartz, 2010:1524).  At a 
time of declining marriage rates, the only group in society whose marriage rates have increased 
is the top 5 percent of women defined by income.  These women, taken together with the 
comparable group of men, constitute the societal sector where gender-based income differences 
have grown most markedly and where highly paid men are most likely to outnumber and outearn 
highly paid women  (Greenstone & Looney, 2012).  While the effects are not as dramatic, the 
emphasis on marriage has increased for the larger group of college graduates as a whole.  Among 
this group, the divorce rate has fallen substantially since 1990 even as it has increased for the rest 
of society, the non-marital birth rate, as least among whites, has remained low, and the likelihood 
that the children of college graduate parents are in two-parent homes increased between 1982 
and 2006 for both whites and African-Americans (McLanahan,  2004; Wilcox & Marquardt, 
2010). 
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The result is the emergence of marriage as a marker of class.  College graduates invest in 
their education and careers.  They postpone family formation until they have the financial 
security and emotional stability to devote themselves to children.  In the rest of society, stable 
women find reliable men increasingly hard to find.  They see little point in postponing 
childbearing for an event they do not expect to happen.  Instead, they invest in themselves and 
rely on relatives to help care for their children.  Both groups see marriage as a partnership 
premised on commitment and trust, but they do not share similar levels of confidence in the 
ability to realize that ideal.   
 
The Marriage Divide: Ideology and Public Policy 
 
Scholars agree that changing marriage rates reflect a combination of women’s greater 
independence and the declining fortunes of blue collar men. (Carbone & Cahn, 2014) They 
disagree profoundly, however, about appropriate responses.  A major reason is that the debate 
over marriage maps onto an increasing ideological divide that frames political choices.  
Over the last thirty years, American politics have become increasingly polarized, 
particularly among partisan activists: political polarization maps onto basic underlying values 
orientations.  In a metastudy of political attitudes, for example, Jost (2006) argues that the 
prevalence of “liberal” traits, such as openness to change, versus “conservative” ones, such as 
the veneration of tradition, is a major factor in political loyalties and the party realignment that 
has occurred over the last twenty-five years (Jost, 2006: 654). These basic orientations frame 
attitudes toward the family. People with conservative approaches distrust change and tend to 
respond to greater insecurity with calls to renew the commitment to tradition.  They therefore 
support calls for greater emphasis on marriage.  Conservatives, who also tend to be more 
individualistic, blame the decline of marriage on deteriorating moral values.  They respond to 
appeals framed in terms of absolutes, and oppose measures, such as sex education, that depend 
on nuanced messages.  Liberals tend to be more egalitarian and pragmatic and often recoil from 
traditionalist emphasis on marriage.  They support greater access to contraception and abortion, 
greater support for all children irrespective of family form, and greater efforts to remake the 
infrastructure that supports childrearing so that it is less dependent on marriage or on women’s 
unpaid caretaking (Cahn & Carbone, 2010). 
This combination of more ideological politics, the family as a site of profound societal 
change, and the framing of the marriage debate in terms that overlap with underlying values 
orientations makes marriage the source of a fundamental political and policy divide.  That divide 
produces different family law in different states on issues as basic as the recognition of legal 
parenthood and awarding custody. 
 
The Marriage Divide: Law and Gender 
 
The marriage debate collides with the reality that has produced different family systems at the 
top and the bottom of the new economic order.  Within this, the family also stands on a new 
gender bargain.  The renewed commitment to marriage at the top comes within a neo-patriarchal 
family law system.  At the bottom, women enjoy more control of relationships outside of 
marriage than within it.  
 Elite women are willing to commit because of their ability to find men who offer the right 
combination of societal advantages (income, status or prestige) and acceptable behavior (fidelity, 
4 
 
respect, companionship).  Men in turn also commit when they find a true partner, one who helps 
them feel good about themselves and who enhances their ability to realize their ambitions and 
dreams.  For the couples who make that commitment, family law serves traditional ends.  It 
recognizes an interdependent economic union and splits the parties’ assets if they divorce.  It also 
recognizes a new norm of joint parenting, and accords equal custodial rights to men.  This 
system makes it easier for elite spouses to enforce premarital agreements that insulate the assets 
of a wealthier spouse.  It also allows the men with the assets to pursue custodial rights to secure 
continued involvement with their children.  Married men are more likely than unmarried men to 
obtain shared custody orders after a split, and within each group, the more money a man has the 
more likely he is to enjoy shared custody (Brown & Cook, 2012). 
 Failing committed partnerships, men get sex on their terms, and women manage the child 
on their terms (Edin & Nelson, 2013: 214).  They take responsibility for the child's financial and 
caretaking needs.  To the extent a man helps out, he has continued access. To the extent he is 
jealous, abusive or an unreliable additional burden who demands too much of the mother's 
energies, his relationship with the child will be at risk.  The women, as a general rule, support the 
child, though some certainly conflate their own interests with the child's needs. This model is 
essentially a single parent model, reflecting the "authentic" emerging bargain of the non-elite.  It 
neither receives official support in the law nor can it.  It is at odds with the new elite model and 
largely remains invisible.  Women, who are not on welfare but who are not wealthy enough to 
make into the elite marriage markets, simply stay out of court - and out of marriage.  The burden 
is on the man to establish paternity, and if he does, to get a custodial order, and then to enforce 
it.   
 As this system becomes more visible, however, it contradicts both traditionalist insistence 
on marriage and male authority and modernist notions of gender equality and equal rights for 
mothers and fathers.  The result is a new effort to reimpose men on women and to insist on 
involving two parents in the child's life.  This move, which is consistent with both conservative 
and liberal expectations about appropriate family behavior, does violence, however, to the reality 
of non-elite women's lives. They do not have the option of mating with reliable men, and they do 
not have the wherewithal to sever the father's parental rights as a matter of law.   Legal reforms, 
which simplified paternity establishment in the Clinton era, now seek to help unmarried men to 
assert custodial rights and gain greater access to the courts (See generally Huntington, 2015)  
These efforts  impose the elite gender bargain on the non-elite.   
 
Where next? 
 
While the existence of class-based differences is now well-documented, there is no agreement on 
solutions. Yet, there are two obvious ones, rarely discussed in explicit terms. The first recreates 
the links between stable jobs and stable families, and attempts to make the elite family model 
accessible to a larger percentage of the population.  This approach accepts the importance of 
marriage, and advocates strategies that make it more likely that two partners will find advantages 
in parenting together.  Such strategies require greater economic equality, more opportunities for 
blue-collar men, greater support for higher education and job training, and better access to 
contraception and other supports for delaying family formation. While this model includes 
economic policies associated with blue values, it overlaps with red ideology on the importance of 
marriage. 
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 What is the red alternative? Bring back patriarchy. Conservatives like Charles Murray 
blame changing values, charging that the men have become lazy because women no longer 
depend on them or fail to sleep with them until they shape up (Murray, 2012). What is the secret 
to bringing back female dependence and male virtue? Make the women desperate. Conservatives 
see single mothers as the problem.  The “war on women”  restricts access to contraception, 
abortion and divorce, limits public support for childrearing, and seeks to restore female 
dependence that makes marriage indispensable to childrearing. 
Is there a third option?  We believe there is.  Whether or not it is possible to recreate a 
system of stable two parent families (the first alternative), the subordination of women is 
unacceptable (the second alternative).  The alternative to greater coercion is recognition that 
family variety is likely to be a permanent feature of the new era, and that all parents, married or 
single, male or female, are likely to spend most of their adulthoods in the labor market.  We have 
not yet remade the workplace to accommodate childrearing, nor have we marshaled the resources 
necessary to insure the minimum level of investment in children necessary to promote full 
citizenship in a new, more demanding era.  Rebuilding the infrastructure for childrearing thus 
requires: 1) recognition that maturity is a plus for parenting and workforce participation and 
universal access to contraception and, if necessary, abortion, is an essential aspect of responsible 
parenting; 2) that just as free compulsory primary and secondary education became hallmarks of 
the industrial era, universal access to high quality early childhood education should define the 
information age; 3) creation of family-friendly workplaces for mothers and fathers to advance 
both gender equality and adequate support for childrearing; and 4) a well-constructed safety net 
that provides universal access to health care and assists parents’ ability to move in and out of the 
workforce in accordance with children’s needs.    This system will provide greater support for 
parents who wish to trade-off childrearing responsibilities, but it will also make single parenting 
less perilous.  To make such a system work, family law should recognize those who contribute to 
children rather than assume equality on the basis of biology alone.   Ironically, the marriage 
divide as a marker of politics and privilege will end only when children’s well-being no longer 
depends so exclusively on the strained resources parents can bring to the endeavor. 
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